




THE EVIDENCE AT VUNG RO BAY





100 TONS OF WAR CARGO for Viet Cong were brought by steel craft sunk at Vung Ro.





THE EVIDENCE AT VUNG-RO BAY



The magnitude and significance of North Viet-Nam's support to the Viet Cong are demonstrated clearly by the arms dumps found at the edge of the sparkling blue waters of a narrow cove at Vung Ro, in South Viet-Nam.


At least 100 tons of weapons, ammunition, medicines and other supplies have been uncovered.

Inescapable evidence—markings, documents, the types of weapons themselves, and a ship sunk here while carrying arms—shows that these arms were sent by sea from North Viet-Nam.

This discovery must be considered in the light of the history of communist Viet Cong insurgency in South Viet-Nam and the logistical problems facing the communists.

Five years ago, when the Viet Cong began to step up their effort to destroy orderly government in the Republic of Viet-Nam, their weaponry was relatively simple.

They relied upon weapons which had been



buried in South Viet-Nam before the 1954 Geneva accords, arms which they captured from government forces, and crude weapons which the Viet Cong made in secret workshops.

This level of armament was appropriate to their state of organization and immediate objectives at that time.

Viet Cong units were, for the most part, small, on the classical guerrilla pattern. Their chief mission was to intimidate or assassinate administrators, teachers, and other local officials in the countryside.

The Viet Cong have never ceased terrorism, which is in fact their principal day-to-day effort throughout the Republic of Viet-Nam.

As the insurgency went on, however, the Viet Cong formed increasing numbers of units of battalion size, with command structures, armament and communications to support military operations on a much larger scale than guerrilla actions. Improved equipment sent from North Viet-Nam played an important part.

Such forces were utilized for attacks on government outposts and to engage South Vietnamese units. With rare exceptions, however, the Viet Cong continued to avoid protracted clashes with regular army battalions, dispersing when government forces concentrated against them.

The Viet Cong's problems were magnified when, in response to the request of the Vietnamese government, the United States began in 1961 to provide military assistance on a larger scale—helping to improve the equipment, training, and mobility of the government forces.

In the eyes of the Viet Cong, these improvements must have seemed a critical threat to their long-term strategy.

This strategy, made clear in many Viet Cong pronouncements and documents, is to inflict such damage upon the military and administrative structure of South Viet-Nam that fatigue and weariness would eventually lead to acceptance of a coalition government, which they would hope to dominate. They would then attempt to seize absolute power when the time appeared appropriate.

***MADE IN CHINA:** many weapons, supplies captured at Vung Ro had abbreviated Chinese characters used only in Communist China.*

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**INTERNATIONAL
INSPECTION:** *members of the
International Control
Commission appointed by the
1954 Geneva Conference to
police the cease-fire between
North and South Viet-Nam
viewed the findings
at Vung Ro.*



The communist regime in Hanoi has sought to turn the scales in favor of the Viet Cong by a massive infusion of men, equipment and supplies from the north.

This is nothing new. From the outset, the Viet Cong insurgency has been dependent for its leadership and specialists upon cadres sent down from the north. Material support was also provided in considerable and increasing quantities.

The size of the Viet Cong regular forces has grown steadily in recent years. For example, the Viet Cong at present have five regimental headquarters compared with two in 1961. The main VC force is composed of 50 battalions, 50 percent more than before. There are an estimated 139 VC companies. Hard-core VC strength now is estimated at more than 32,000 personnel—and it was less than 20,000 in 1961.

Supporting the main force units of the Viet Cong are an estimated 60,000 to 80,000 part-time guerrillas. They are generally organized at the district level where there are likely to be several companies of 50 or more men each.

During the past year, Hanoi's support for the Viet Cong has taken on a new dimension. Infiltration of cadres appears to have been stepped up significantly during 1964.

North Viet-Nam has also been sending a large volume of weapons of types which had never been seen in South Viet-Nam before—arms of communist-bloc design, most of them manufactured in Communist China.

These weapons include many advanced types—rapid-fire automatic small-arms of the type now standard in Communist China and other communist-bloc forces, heavy machine guns, and large-caliber recoilless rifles. An increasing number of weapons from external communist sources have been seized by South Vietnamese troops. These include such weapons as 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles, dual-purpose machine guns, rocket launchers, large mortars, and anti-tank mines.

A new family of Chinese communist-manufactured weapons has recently appeared in Viet Cong hands. These include the 7.62 semi-automatic carbine, 7.62 light machine guns, and the 7.62 assault rifle. These weapons and compatible ammunition—manufactured in Communist China in 1962—were first captured in December 1964 in Chuong Thien province. Similar weapons have since been seized from the Viet Cong in each of



ANTI-TANK ROCKETS manufactured in Communist China following Soviet design were among military supplies shipped by Hanoi to the Viet Cong and captured by Vietnamese forces.



OVER A MILLION ROUNDS
*of ammunition were uncovered in
several Viet Cong caches.*



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the four corps areas of South Viet-Nam. Also captured have been Chinese communist anti-tank grenade launchers and ammunition made in China in 1963.

The communists have also sent down simpler, older weapons for the use of their lower-level guerrilla forces.

None of these arms—except for a few of the heavier weapons which are copies of American models—can use ammunition which the Viet Cong might capture in South Viet-Nam.

Thus, although the Viet Cong have acquired higher fire-power and standardized weapons for the main-force units, they have become even more heavily dependent upon the north for ammunition.


Hanoi's methods to provide the supplies have been shown clearly in Vung Ro Bay.

On February 16, 1965, an American helicopter pilot flying along the South Vietnamese coast sighted a suspicious vessel. It was a cargo ship of an estimated 100-ton capacity, carefully camouflaged and moored, just offshore, along the coast of Phu Yen province. Fighter planes that approached the vessel met machine-gun fire from the deck of the ship and from the shore as well. A Vietnamese air force strike was launched against the vessel and Vietnamese government troops moved into the area. They seized the ship after a bitter fight with the Viet Cong.

The ship, which had been sunk in shallow water, had discharged a huge cargo of arms, ammunition and other supplies. Documents found on the ship and on the bodies of several Viet Cong aboard identified the vessel as having come from North Viet-Nam. A newspaper in the cabin was from Haiphong and was dated January 23, 1965. The supplies delivered by the ship—thousands of weapons and more than a million rounds of ammunition—were almost all of communist origin, largely from Communist China and Czechoslovakia, as well as North Viet-Nam. At least 100 tons of military supplies were discovered near the ship.

Wooden-handled grenades, of the type used by the Chinese communists during the Korean war, bore Chinese communist arsenal markings and dates as late as May 1964.

A preliminary survey of the cache near the sunken vessel from Hanoi disclosed the following supplies and weapons:



DOCUMENTS ON SHIP sunk by the Vietnamese Air Force established its origin beyond any reasonable doubt.

Among them were these official North Vietnamese Army and Navy documents (above and left).



MORTAR SHELLS, still in packing crates, were destined for Viet Cong terrorists.



SUPPLIES bore labels from Communist China and several other communist countries.

—approximately 1,000,000 rounds of small ammunition

—more than 1,000 stick grenades

—500 pounds of TNT in prepared charges

—2,000 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition

—500 anti-tank grenades

—500 rounds of 57mm recoilless rifle ammunition

—more than 1,000 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle ammunition

—one 57mm recoilless rifle

—two heavy machine guns

—2,000 7.95 Mauser rifles

—more than 100 7.62 carbines

—1,000 submachine guns

—15 light machine guns

—500 rifles

—four tons of medical supplies (with labels from North Viet-Nam, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Soviet Union, and other sources).

The ship was fairly new and had been made in Communist China. Documents aboard the ship included three North Vietnamese nautical charts (one of the Haiphong area and one of Hong Gay, both in North Viet-Nam, and one of the Tra Vinh area of South Viet-Nam). The military health records of North Vietnamese soldiers were found. One man had a political history sheet showing he was a member of the 338th Division of the North Vietnamese Army.

Also aboard the North Vietnamese ship were: an instruction book for a Chinese communist navigational device; postcards and letters to addresses in North Viet-Nam; snapshots, including one of a group of men in North Vietnamese army uniforms under a flag of the Hanoi government.

Members of the International Control Commission and representatives of the press visited the sunken North Vietnamese ship and viewed its cargo—a dramatic confirmation of earlier evidence that Hanoi is behind the continuing campaign of aggression aimed at conquering the Republic of Viet-Nam.

The International Control Commission itself had issued a special report as early as June 1962, stating that there was “sufficient evidence to show beyond reasonable doubt” that North Viet-Nam had sent arms and personnel into South Viet-Nam to carry out subversion aimed at overthrowing the government. The Commission found



3,500 RIFLES AND SUBMACHINEGUNS were among the thousands of weapons of advanced design captured at Vung Ro.

Hanoi had specifically violated four provisions of the 1954 Geneva accords.

The full scale of the discovery at Vung Ro Bay is not yet known—11 caches have been discovered so far. There are grounds for speculation that denial to the Viet Cong of such a quantity of arms and ammunition might cause a significant setback to their effort.

The Viet Cong—and the North Vietnamese regime—also have other grounds for concern. During recent months Viet Cong units have chosen on a number of occasions to remain in position for protracted engagements with government forces.

In a few such clashes, the Viet Cong have gained some success. But overall, government units have won the upper hand. During the month of January, for example, eight such large-scale engagements took place, and government forces defeated the Viet Cong in all eight.

Whatever the immediate military effect upon the Viet Cong, the discovery of the arms dumps at Vung Ro Bay has shattered decisively any doubts about the scale and importance of Hanoi's support to the Viet Cong.

As the U.S. State Department pointed out in the documented report, released at the end of February 1965, presenting massive evidence of North Vietnamese aggression:


"It establishes beyond question that North Viet-Nam is carrying out a carefully conceived plan of aggression against the South. It shows that North Viet-Nam has intensified its efforts in the years since it was condemned by the International Control Commission. It proves that Hanoi continues to press its systematic program of armed aggression into South Viet-Nam.

"This aggression violates the United Nations Charter. It is directly contrary to the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 to which North Viet-Nam is a party. It shatters the peace of South-east Asia. It is a fundamental threat to the freedom and security of South Viet-Nam."

The United States has repeatedly stated its readiness to reduce its military involvement in South Viet-Nam—if aggression from Hanoi is checked and peace restored. But Americans will not abandon friends who are fighting for their freedom. It is now up to Hanoi to choose a continued, increasingly destructive war—or peace.







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